Wrong Side of the Mountain: A Comment on Bad Faith\u27s Unnatural History by Jerry, Robert H., II
University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository
Faculty Publications
1994
Wrong Side of the Mountain: A Comment on Bad
Faith's Unnatural History
Robert H. Jerry II
University of Missouri School of Law, jerryr@missouri.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/facpubs
Part of the Contracts Commons
This Response or Comment is brought to you for free and open access by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository.
Recommended Citation
Robert H. II Jerry, Wrong Side of the Mountain: A Comment on Bad Faith's Unnatural History, 72 Tex. L. Rev. 1317, 1344 (1994)
The Wrong Side of the Mountain: A Comment on
Bad Faith's Unnatural History
Robert H. Jerry, II*
Professor Abraham is correct that the current climate for bad faith
liability has a different feel than the one that existed as recently as ten
years ago, and it cannot be doubted that, as he explains with his typical
incisiveness, the climate has in fact changed in many ways.1 The ebb and
flow in the tumult in bad faith law over the last three decades has been
remarkable in and of itself, but some of the most startling aspects of this
history involve the early turns this tumult took. Much like an orienteer
who makes a two-degree error at the beginning of a hike and within a few
hours finds herself on the wrong side of the mountain, the choices courts
made when first using their compasses ordained a rather divergent path
from the trail that might have made more sense. If the trail we now
traverse seems to have become easier, perhaps we should continue to fol-
low it and hope that it connects with the original trail some miles ahead.
The other choice requires much effort: climbing up and over the mountain
to get back on the right route. I take it as a given that we are unable to go
back to the junction and start over, although if lost in the mountains, this
is what I would do. Like Professor Abraham, I want more data about
where we are,2 for without better information, it is difficult to have much
confidence about choosing where to go.
In this Comment, I will argue that courts have ignored bad faith's
contractual heritage and have undervalued contract law's ability to respond
to insurer misconduct. To draw upon Professor Powers's thoughtful anal-
ysis, I believe that courts invoked the tort paradigm before it was clear that
* Professor and Herbert Herff Chair of Excellence in Law, University of Memphis. B.S. 1974,
Indiana State University; J.D. 1977, University of Michigan. I am indebted to several people who
offered valuable suggestions on parts of this Comment: Hans W. Baade of the University of Texas,
James A. Brundage of the University of Kansas, Hans-Peter Benohr of the University of Frankfurt,
Bruce W. Frier of the University of Michigan, Francis H. Heller of the University of Kansas, and
Brian P. Levack of the University of Texas. Mistakes that remain are my own.
1. Kenneth S. Abraham, The Natural History of the Insurer's Liability for Bad Faith, 72 TEX. L.
REV. 1295, 1295 (1994).
2. Id. at 1315.
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the contract paradigm was inadequate.3 For lack of data, I will stop short
of recommending where we should go from here, but I will suggest that
our behavior in the face of bad faith liability in tort may have changed no
less than the environment and that the perceived relative calm in the tort's
current development is tenuous in some respects.
I. Bad Faith's Ancient Lineage
The tort of bad faith is a relative newcomer, with a history dating only
to the late 1950s; indeed, the tort was not taken seriously until the 1970s. a
But it is probably also fair to say that, in the contract field, most courts
and commentators did not appreciate until the latter half of this century that
the duty of good faith and fair dealing is an independent duty implied in
every contract or that it possesses the same legal significance as other
duties expressly created by the parties.5 This broad duty of good faith
went beyond the principle that courts were accustomed to applying in other
contexts. The more limited principle of good faith had been used, for
example, to provide a constraint on parties who had no duty to perform
unless they were satisfied with the other party's performance6 and to limit
the discretion of a party to whom authority had been given in the agree-
ment to specify a contract term.7 This relatively late acknowledgement
3. See William Powers, Jr., Border Wars, 72 TEX. L. REv. 1209, 1224-25 (1994) (describing the
contract paradigm as "the ideology of autonomy and consent" and the negligence paradigm as one that
"fills in when we do not have an option to use contract law").
4. In Comunale v. Traders & General Insurance Co., 328 P.2d 198 (Cal. 1958), the California
Supreme Court, while considering whether the statute of limitations had run on the insured's claim of
the insurer's failure to defend and to respond appropriately to the plaintiff's settlement offer, stated in
dictum that a wrongful refusal to settle had generally been treated as a tort. Id. at 203. It was not until
1967 that the court accepted its own invitation to find the breach of the contractual covenant of good
faith and fair dealing to be a tort. See Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173, 177 (Cal. 1967) (en
banc) (stating that liability for breach of an insurer's implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
will be imposed for unreasonable rejections of settlement offers, regardless of bad faith on the part of
the insurer). In 1973, the California Supreme Court extended this analysis to first-party insurance,
holding that the breach of the implied covenant in the first-party setting is a tort. Gruenberg v. Aetna
Ins. Co., 510 P.2d 1032, 1038 (Cal. 1973) (en banc).
5. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1979) ("Every contract imposes upon each
party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement."); see also infra
notes 90-101 and accompanying text (tracing good faith's emergence as a duty implied in every
contract).
6. If an agreement conditions a party's duty to perform on its satisfaction with the other party's
performance, there is considerable potential for overreaching by the party whose duty is conditioned;
the obvious temptation is to feign dissatisfaction in order to escape other contract obligations. Thus,
courts require the party whose duty is conditioned to use "good faith" when forming a judgment
regarding her satisfaction with the other's performance. E.g., Mattei v. Hopper, 330 P.2d 625, 627
(Cal. 1958) (en banc); Devoine Co. v. International Co., 136 A. 37, 38 (Md. 1927).
7. Contracting parties often leave one of the parties the option to specify how an open term of the
contract will be filled. This could involve something as simple as the parties' agreement that the seller
shall determine how a shipment of goods will be transported, or it may involve more complicated
1318
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of the full import of the duty of good faith and fair dealing has created
much excitement, but the duty has an ancestral heritage long predating the
modem conceptualization. Indeed, what is most surprising about this
history is how little attention we have paid to it.
A. Early Conceptualizations of Good Faith
1. Roman law.-The essence of a duty of good faith existed at least
two thousand years ago in the law of the Romans.! To summarize what
others have discussed in detail elsewhere, Roman law is credited with
recognizing that a promise can give rise to a duty.9 Because a duty
implies a reciprocal right that can be enforced in appropriate circum-
stances, the Romans' recognition that promises can create duties amounted
to the recognition of promissory liability. Yet during a millennium of
evolution, Roman law never articulated a general theory of contract pur-
suant to which exchanges of promises would be enforced absent formalities
or a return performance."°
relationships, as is the case with output or requirements contracts. For example, if a buyer promises
to purchase all of its requirements for a particular good from a seller, the buyer retains to some degree
the discretion to determine the quantity of its requirements, which defines the scope of the seller's
obligation to the buyer. To constrain the buyer's discretion and to shield the seller from having
unreasonable demands imposed upon it, the buyer is required to determine its requirements in good
faith. See, e.g., Feld v. Henry S. Levy & Sons, Inc., 335 N.E.2d 320, 322-23 (N.Y. 1975) (holding,
in the context of an output contract, that the defendant had terminated production in good faith and thus
had no further obligation to perform); Dickey v. Philadelphia Minit-Man Corp., 105 A.2d 580, 583
(Pa. 1954) (holding that a lessee under contract to pay rent based on a percentage of sales, subject to
a minimum rent amount, could maintain possession of the property after ceasing the business upon
which the sales provision was based, so long as the lessee continued to pay the minimum rent and the
cessation was in good faith).
8. For a different perspective on this issue that reaches the same conclusion, see Nicola W.
Palmieri, Good Faith Disclosures Required During Precontractual Negotiations, 24 SETON HALL L.
REV. 70, 80, 80-83 (1993) (tracing the requirement of good faith to primordial societies and asserting
that as civilizations progressed, "good faith and fairness remained the highest criterion for evaluating
contractual obligations").
9. E. Allan Farnsworth, The Past of Promise: An Historical Introduction to Contract, 69 COLUM.
L. REV. 576, 588 (1969); see HENRY S. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW: ITS CONNECTION WITH THE EARLY
HISTORY OF SOCIETY AND ITS REATION TO MODERN IDEAS 358 (10th ed. 1930) ("[lit cannot be
doubted that [consensual contracts in Roman law] constituted the stage in the history of Contract-law
from which all modern conceptions of contract took their start.").
10. Farnsworth, supra note 9, at 590. It may be inaccurate to suggest, however, that the Romans
failed to develop a general theory of contract or to establish a "general principle of enforceability of
promises." Id. at 588. Professor Alan Watson argues forcefully that
from very early times the Romans did have a method-the stipulatio in fact-by which
parties could agree to create any obligation which was not positively unlawful. If one
dares to speak anachronistically, one can say that in very early times the Romans did have
a general theory of contract, not a law of individual contracts.
ALAN WATSON, THE EVOLUTION OF LAW 6-7 (1985). Watson believes, however, that this general
theory disappeared later in the Roman experience. Id. at 7-28.
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Under Roman law, a promise was not enforceable unless it fell within
one of a few specific categories in which the law had devised narrow
theories for enforcing the promise.11 The Institutes of Justinian and
Gaius'2 divided the Roman law of promissory liability into four cate-
gories, one of which was known as "consensual contracts" (consensu con-
trahitur obligatio).13 The consensual contract developed later in Roman
history than the other three categories, emerging at a time when population
increases and burgeoning commerce required a less cumbersome means of
creating promissory obligations. 4
11. See W.W. BUCKLAND & ARNOLD D. MCNAIR, ROMAN LAW & COMMON LAW: A
COMPARISON IN OUTLINE 195, 193-96 (2d ed. 1952) ("IT]he attitude of the Roman law can be fairly
stated by the proposition that an agreement is not a contract unless the law, for some reason, erects it
into one."); F.H. LAWSON, A COMMON LAWYER LOOKS AT THE CIVIL LAW 113 (1955) (asserting the
general principal that "[a] nude pact did not beget an action").
12. The Institutes of Justinian and Gaius was a four-book manual, partly historical and partly
theoretical, that briefly but comprehensively summarized the whole body of Roman law. RUDOLPH
SOHM, THE INSTITUTES: A TEXTBOOK OF THE HISTORY AND SYSTEM OF ROMAN PRIVATE LAW § 6,
at 16 (James C. Ledlie trans., 3d ed. 1970). The manual was designed to serve as a prefix to a
codification of Roman law in a Digest-a collection of excerpts from the writings of Romanjurists-and
a Code-a collection of imperial decrees and the laws. Id. The Institutes nevertheless had the full
force of law, as did the Digest and the Code. Id. Justinian's imperial minister, Tribonian, and two
professors under his supervision, Theophilus and Dorotheus, composed the Institutes, drawing heavily
on the earlier Institutes of Gaius and Res Quotidianae of Gaius. Id. § 21, at 122.
13. In addition to the consensual contract, Roman law recognized these three categories: real
contracts (re contrahitur obligatio), verbal contracts (verbis contrahitur obligado), and literal contracts
(litteris contrahitur obligatio). LAWSON, supra note 11, at 113; FRn-z SCHULZ, CLASSICAL ROMAN
LAW 468-69 (1951). The four-part categorization, which may have been invented by Gaius, was not
well contrived; it was at least accurate, however, in that no "contracts" other than those listed in the
categorization were recognized in the classical period. SCHULZ, supra, at 469. By the sixth century,
a group of contracts outside the four-part categorization called "innominate contracts" were recognized
under Justinian's law. LAWSON, supra note II, at 131. What distinguished these contracts was "a new
principle, i.e. that in an agreement for mutual services performance on one side binds the other. The
essence is the quidpro quo, absent in the contracts re." W.W. BUCKLAND, A TEXT-BOOK OF ROMAN
LAW FROM AUGUSTUS TO JUSTINIAN 521 (3d ed. 1963) [hereinafter BUCKLAND, TExT-BOOK OF
ROMAN LAW]. Because innominate contracts required full performance by one side, the action was
limited, but the action was different in that it was not limited to specific kinds of transactions. Id. at
521-26. Nevertheless, whatever potential the innominate contract had to evolve into a general theory
for enforcing an exchange of promises absent formalities was unrealized in Roman law. See id.
(outlining the various types of innominate contracts, each of which required the presence of an
underlying formal contract).
14. WILLIAM L. BURDICK, THE PRINCIPLES OF ROMAN LAW AND THEIR RELATION TO MODERN
LAW 442 (1938); Reinhard Zimmerman, Roman-Dutch Jurisprudence and Its Contribution to European
Private Law, 66 TUL. L. REv. 1685, 1689-91 (1992). The formal requirements of the other kinds of
contracts limited their usefulness. For example, the stipulation-the only important kind of verbal
contract-bound only one party to a promise and thus was unwieldy for bilateral exchanges. There
were only a few rules that had to be followed to create a stipulation, but those rules had to be observed
exactly: (1) both parties had to speak to each other (not give signs or write), and both had to be capable
of understanding each other; (2) both parties had to be present during the entire act; (3) the promisee
had to first ask a solemn question to the promisor, such as "Centum mihi dari spondes?" (Do you
undertake?), and the promisee had to answer immediately with a word such as "Spondeo" (I
undertake); and (4) the answer had to correspond precisely to the question. Thus, if the promisee
1320
1994] Bad Faith's Unnatural History 1321
The classical ius dvile5 recognized four kinds of consensual con-
tracts: sale (emptio venditio), hire (locatio conductio), partnership
(societas), and mandate (mandatum)." Although these were the only
categories of consensual contracts enforced, the scope of these categories
was extremely wide, covering "almost all the normal operations of Roman
business, except the loan of money and certain types of security."7
Moreover, consensual contracts evolved in ways that served the needs of
Rome's increasingly complex commerce. Substantively, however, the pro-
missory obligation in these contracts was "flexibly defined by reference to
good faith; the judge had a wide discretion which enabled him to take into
account the particularities of the individual case." 8 The formulae,
standardized documents used to "authorize" a judge to enter a decree in a
dispute, 9 invariably treated the question of the breacher's liability in
consensual contract disputes as a question of law 2° and contained the
spoke in Latin, the promisor could not speak in Greek. If the promisor asked "Dari spondes?" the
promisee had to answer "Spondeo," not "Promitto" or "Accipio." SCHULZ, supra note 13, at 473-74.
Real contracts were similarly cumbersome; they required delivering a corporeal thing, which the
recipient was bound to restore. See SOHM, supra note 12, § 79, at 375-82 (discussing the difference
between nominate real contracts, in which the person to whom the property is delivered is bound to
give it back, and innominate real contracts, in which the person is bound to give something in return).
The literal contract involved entering promises in ledgers that well-to-do citizens customarily kept. Id.
§ 81, at 391-92. Gradually, the literal contract fell into disuse. Id. at 395.
15. "lus civile" refers to the "common law" or "general custom of the realm," a body of law not
governed by statute. W.W. BUCKLAND, THE MAIN INTrlUTIONS OF ROMAN PRIVATE LAW 14 (1931)
[hereinafter ROMAN PRIVATE LAW]; MAX KASER, ROMAN PRIVATE LAW 23-24 (Rolf Dannenbring
trans., 1965).
16. SCHULZ, supra note 13, at 524-25.
17. LAWSON, supra note 11, at 121. For the Romans, like most societies, sale covered a broad
range of commercial transaction. Id. at 120. Contracts for "hire" in Roman law included not only
the leasing of land, buildings, and goods, but also the employer-employeerelation, bailments, contracts
for transportation of pcople or goods, contracts to repair goods, contracts to construct buildings or
goods (except when the manufacturer supplied all of the raw materials, in which case the transaction
was a sale), and some kinds of insurance. Id. Partnership included all profit and not-for-profit associa-
tions and joint ventures. Id. at 121. Mandate included all transactions in which one person gratuitous-
ly undertook to do something for another, which in some instances included the agency relationship.
Id. at 121.
18. SCHULZ, supra note 13, at 525.
19. In the classical period, ordinry civil procedure began with a proceeding before a magistrate
(proceedings in jure); if the magistrate failed to commence an indicium, the plaintiff's claim was
dismissed. Id. at 13. Otherwise, the magistrate "formulated" the action in his court and referred the
matter to another tribunal for resolution. BUCKLAND, TEXT-BOOK OF ROMAN LAW, supra note 13,
at 627. The official document in which the referral was contsined was the formula. Over time,
numerousformulae became standardized, and lawyers of the period possessed stockpiles offormulae.
SCHULZ, supra note 13, at 19-20. The formula, being an instruction to the tribunal deciding the case,
could be modified to state the exact issue for decision, which became a way new actions, defenses,
rights, and liabilities could be created. BUCKLAND, TEXT-BOOK OF ROMAN LAW, supra note 13. at
627. This procedure was used for about five centuries in the Roman Empire, including the classical
period. BURDICK, supra note 14, at 636.
20. The cause of action available for a breach of contract was the standard formulae in ius
conceptae. SCHULZ, supra note 13, at 525. A formula that was designated in jus was one in which
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clause ex fide bona.1 The original purpose of the clause ex fide bona
was to provide an independent source of obligation on which a judgment
for breach of contract could be founded.' When no longer needed for
this purpose, the clause survived to provide a standard by which each of
the contracting parties' performances would be measured. Thus, ex fide
bona authorized the judge to fix the sum that the defendant owed the plain-
tiff according to standards of good faith. 3 Professor Solm described sale
in this way: "Sale is a bonae fidei negotium, i.e. both parties are bound,
not merely to do what they expressly undertook to do, but to do all that is
involved in the requirements of good faith."' The other three kinds of
consensual contracts included the same reciprocal good faith obligation. 5
Thus, the principles of bona fides, which continually evolved to reflect
prevailing moral ideals, were a part of all consensual contracts. 26
2. The law of promise after the Roman Empire.-Although study of
Roman law did not entirely perish after the decline of the Roman Empire,
it was not until the twelfth century that interest in Roman law was revived
on the continent and exerted some influence on the by-then developing law
in England.' During the intervening centuries, the primitive law of
"the condemnation of the defendant [was] made conditional upon the plaintiff having a right or claim,"
the merits of which could be determined solely through the application of law rather than upon proof
of the existence of certain facts. Id. at 29. In the preparation of aformula, the form of the plaintiff's
claim (intentio) would be either conceived in fact (in factum concepta) or conceived in law (injus
concepta). BURDICK, supra note 14, at 646.
21. SCHUL.Z, supra note 13, at 525. If the clause exfide bona appeared in a formula, the pro-
ceeding was called a bonaefidei indicium, and pursuant to the procedure, the judge was ordered to
pronouncejudgment in accordance with what good faith required. Id. at 35.
22. KASER, supra note 15, at 142.
23. LAWSON, supra note 11, at 124-25; SCHULZ, supra note 13, at 35. Kaser succinctly describes
this evolution:
From the beginning of the classical age bonaefidei indicia were accepted as part of the
ius civile because it was thought that good faith was just as binding as a lex. The function
of bonafides changed accordingly; bonafides was no longer needed as an independent
source of obligation, but it now provided a standard according to which the judge had to
examine the legal relationship. The content of the obligation was now taken to comprise
all that which had been informally agreed upon by the parties themselves, with regard to
the source and content of obligations, but also that which-even failing such agreement-
was to be regarded as being owed according to the concrete circumstances and in
consideration of the local and general custom.
KASER, supra note 15, at 142-43.
24. SOHM, supra note 12, § 82, at 396-97.
25. Id. § 82, at 405 ("[Tihe contract of hire is a bonae fidei negotium.'); id. § 82, at 406-07
(discussing the obligation of good faith in partnership contracts); id. § 82, at 407 (noting that the
mandate contract "binds both parties to do all that is required by bona fides").
26. PETER STEIN, FAULT IN THE FORiATION OF CONTRACT IN ROMAN LAW AND SCOTS L4w 6
(1958).
27. 1 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGUSH LAW BEFORE
THE TIME OF EDWARD 1, at 1 (reprint 1923) (London, Cambridge Univ. Press, 2d ed. 1898); see PAUL
1322
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promise on the continent contained hints of the moralistic good faith
standard that the classical Romans had used to measure performance under
consensual contracts. For example, the Franks~l devised a sacramental
ceremony for making a promise binding. When one party owed another
a debt that could not be secured fully, the debtor made "faith 'with gage
and pledge'" in a ritual called fidesfacta.29 As this ceremony developed,
the debtor passed thefestuca-a stick, and later a piece of straw-from one
of his hands to the other, and then to the creditor. By this ceremony of
fides facta, the debtor bound himself to the creditor; rather than pro-
viding animate security to the creditor, the debtor was regarded as "a
hostage who is at large but is bound to surrender himself if called upon to
do so."31 In effect, the good faith of the debtor either to perform or to
surrender himself secured the creditor's loan.
The ceremony offidesfacta probably evolved into the ritual of mutual
grasp of hands, a method of binding promises found in many early cul-
tures. 2 By the mutual handgrip, "the promisor proffered his hand in the
name of himself and for the purpose of devoting himself to the god or the
goddess if he broke faith."33 The resemblance of the mutual handgrip to
the Roman ceremony of stipulation, as well as the similarity of the term
"fidesfacta" to the phrase "fidemfacere" used by Romans to describe the
0. VINORADoFF, ROMAN LAW IN MEDIEVAL EUROPE 97, 97-117 (2d ed. 1929) (arguing that Roman
law "exercised a potent influence on the formation of legal doctrines during the critical twelfth and
thirteenth centuries, when the foundations of the common law were laid"); 2 WILLIAM S.
HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 202-06 (3d ed. 1923) (surveying the ways in which
Roman law influenced the development of English common law); cf. PETER STEIN, Roman Law and
English Jurisprudence Yesterday and Today, in THE CHARACrER AND INFLUENCE OF THE ROMAN
CIVIL LAw 151, 151-53 (1988) [hereinafter CHARACTER AND INFLUENCE] (describing Henry of
Bracton's effort in the 13th century to prove that the English common law was coherent and rational
by comparing it to the codified Roman civil law). Also, there is evidence that early in the 17th
century, English writers began to recognize Roman law's influence upon English law. See PETER
STEIN, Continental Influences on English Legal Thought 1600-1900, in CHARACTER AND INFLUENCE,
supra, at 209, 212-14 (describing the work of writers who argued that English law coincided to a large
degree with Roman law).
28. The Franks were a Germanic tribe that occupied the Rhine Valley from roughly the third to
eighth centuries. EDWARD JAMES, THE FRANKS 6, 7 (1988).
29. 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 27, at 187. A thing given by way of security-what
would now be called a "pledge"-was in this period called a "gage." The word "pledge" meant for
the Franks that which we would now call a "surety"-a person who guarantees a debt. Gage, then,
was security by thing; a pledge was security by person. Id. at 185 n.2.
30. Id. at 186-88.
31. Id. at 187.
32. See 2 id. at 187-89 (hypothesizing about the process by which thefidesfacta evolved into the
common handshakeritual). This substituted for an earlier version of the ceremony in which the debtor
passed thefestuca to the creditor who handed it to the pledge. This made the pledge the creditor's
hostage, while the pledge had power to constrain the debtor to pay the debt. Id.
33. Id. at 188.
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ceremony of stipulatio, suggests thatfidesfacta was a ceremony borrowed
from the Romans.'
The development of the simple contract on the continent probably
paralleled the development of the formal contract in Anglo-Saxon England.
In the earliest time, the Anglo-Saxon contract was probably created by
delivering a chattel of little value and furnishing sureties. 5 As on the
continent, other ceremonies-such as the handgrasp, the oath, or a simple
pledge to perform in "good faith"-would soon serve to substitute for
furnishing tangible security.36 Whatever the original source of the ritual
of fides facta, "the feudal, or rather the vassalic contract, is a formal
contract and its very essence isfides, faith, fealty. " 1 7
3. Canon law.-As these rules evolved, a new body of law was
emerging under the auspices of the Christian Church that filled the absence
of order after the collapse of the Roman Empire. By the tenth and elev-
enth centuries, "for the greater part of the Continent... ecclesiastical law
[was] the only sort of law that [was] visibly growing."" Under the
influence of the Church, the ceremony of fidesfacta was transformed into
the pledge of faith. In effect, the gage provided by the debtor was the
debtor's Christian faith and his hope of salvation. 9 Usually promisors
pledged their faith to ecclesiastics, but it is likely that promisors sometimes
pledged their faith to promisees.' From this ritual, it was a short step to
recognizing a promisor's "word" or "honor" as sufficient to bind a pro-
mise.41 In effect, then, a person would treat another's promise as having
value only because of the promisor's pledge that performance would be
forthcoming in fides or in good faith, which was evidenced by the pro-
misor's willingness to sacrifice his honor or even his hope of eternal life
in the event he should fail to perform. In addition, by the middle of the
34. Id. at 188-89.
35. Harold D. Hazeltine, The Formal Contract of Early English Law, 10 CoLUM. L. REV. 608,
609 (1910).
36. Id.
37. 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 27, at 189. Pollock and Maitland consider "feudalism"
an "unfortunate word," because the feudal period, the key characteristic of which was the presence of
"dependent and derivative land tenure" arising out of the relationship of lord and vassal, describes
conditions in England and the continent from the eighth or ninth to the 14th or 15th centuries. 1 id.
at 66-67. Regardless, the faith inherent infidesfacta presumably became the good faith obligation of
the feudal contract.
38. Id. at 18.
39. 2 id. at 190.
40. Id. at 191-92.
41. See id. at 192 ("And like a man's religious faith, so his worldly honour can be regarded as
an object that is pawned to a creditor."); THEODORE F. PLUCKN'T, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE
COMMON LAW 630-31 (5th ed. 1956) (observing that the pledge of faith was treated as a material object
by medieval society).
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twelfth century, the Church had taken over the law of marriage, and it
began to teach that binding marriage contracts could be formed by merely
exchanging words.42 Within another century, this notion had spilled over
to nonmarriage agreements; exchanged promises were treated as morally
binding regardless of whether they were accompanied by security or a
pledge of faith.'
In canon law, then, the ideal of good faith figured prominently among
those identifiable principles against which the behavior of contracting
parties was measured. In Holdsworth's view, canon law "put into legal
form the religious and moral ideas which, at this period, coloured the
economic thought of all the nations of Western Europe," and thus "con-
tributed to enforce those high standards of good faith and fair dealing
which are the very life of trade.""
Canon law also influenced the law of promises in England. For in-
stance, the ecclesiastical courts in England were willing to enforce simple
promises at a time when the common law courts issued writs of prohibition
to prevent recourse to these courts.'5 In addition, the first chancellors
were ecclesiastics who naturally were trained in canon law.' Thus, the
basic principles of the ecclesiastical courts were adopted and applied in the
Court of Chancery.47
4. Summary.-Although not a great deal can be said about the status
of the development of English law in the eleventh and twelfth centuries,"8
it is clear that Roman law and ecclesiastical law, two closely related legal
systems, helped shape English law. As Pollock and Maitland have ex-
plained, "in the days of our King Stephen the imperial mother and her
papal daughter were fairly good friends. It was hand in hand that they
entered England. The history of law in England, and even the history of
42. 2 POLLOCK & MAIT..AND, supra note 27, at 195; Charles Donahue, Jr., The Canon Law on
the Formation of Marriage and Social Practice in the Later Middle Ages, 8 J. OF FAM. HIST. 144, 144
(1983).
43. 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 27, at 195.
44. 5 W.S. HoLDswORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 80, 81 (2d ed. 1937), quoted in E. Allan
Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and Commercial Reasonableness Under the Uniform Commercial
Code, 30 U. CHI. L. REv. 666, 670 (1963) [hereinafter Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance].
45. Raphael Powell, Good Faith in Contracts, 9 CuRRENT LFGAL PRORS. 16, 22 (1956); see also
Frederick Pollock, Contracts in Early English Law, 6 HARV. L. REV. 389, 390 (1893) (noting that
ecclesiastical courts competed with secular courts in the field of contract law by censuring breaches of
oaths).
46. 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 27, at 193.
47. Powell, supra note 45, at 22.
48. By the eleventh and twelfth centuries in England, it appears that promises were solemnized
by making oaths on faith and delivering a wed or bohr (basically a material gage). But it is unclear
whether the symbolic gage was sufficient to bind a bargain. 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 27,
at 193.
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English law, could not but be influenced by them." 49 It is also clear that
the law of promise on the continent after the classical Roman era had
similarities to both Roman law and ecclesiastical law. Canon law and
Roman law emphasized the moral ingredients of promises, and this orienta-
tion no doubt influenced early English law. By the thirteenth century,
English law was well on its way to achieving its own independent iden-
tity." Nevertheless, as Part I(B) demonstrates, this independent develop-
ment would be marked periodically by the appearance of the moralistic
"good faith" component of promissory liability that had emerged in Roman
law, was probably transplanted into the primitive legal systems on the
continent at the end of the Roman Empire's reign, and had found its way
into canon law.
B. English Law
1. Good faith under the writ system.-Medieval England's common
law was a formulary system, the content and structure of which was largely
determined by the list of available writs!' By the thirteenth century, the
King's court was willing to entertain an action of debt in cases where a
defendant owed the plaintiff a sum of money.' Also, by this time, the
King's court would entertain an action in covenant where an obligation was
evidenced by a writing under seal and where an action in debt would not
lie.53 These writs were not well suited to providing the basis for a
49. 1 id. at 116-17. This gives a different reading to the work of these historians than does
Professor Farnsworth. See Farnsworth, supra note 9, at 591 ("[R]oman concepts of contract ...
exercised no significant influence on the common law."). Although "the process of arriving at a gen-
eral law of contract was different in England and on the continent," 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra
note 27, at 195, English scholars and jurists studied and, while not controlled by, were certainly
influenced by precepts of Roman and canon law, see PETER STEIN, Legal Theory and the Reform of
Legal Education in Mid-NMneteenth Century England, in CHARACTER AND INFLUENCE, supra note 27,
at 231,243 (noting that Roman law was considered a part of general English jurisprudence in the mid-
19th century); I POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 27, at 135, 117-35 (surveying the influence of
Roman and canon law and concluding that "[o]ur English law shows itself strong enough to assimilate
foreign ideas and convert them to its own use. Of any wholesale 'reception' of Roman law there is no
danger.").
50. See 2 POLLOCK& MAITLAND, supra note27, at 197 ("[B1efore the thirteenth century was out,
both Roman and canon law had lost their power to control the development of English temporal law.").
51. See id. at 558-73 (discussing the various writs). The available writs were recorded in the
"Register," a loose, semi-official compilation of forms. PLUCKNETT, supra note 41, at 276-77.
52. See 2 POLLOCK& MAITLAND, supra note 27, at 203-16 (tracing the development of the action
of debt in the King's court); A.W.B. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OFTHE COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT: THE
RISE OF THE ACTION OF ASSUMPSIT 56-58 (1975) (chronicling the early development of the writ of
debt); Farnsworth, supra note 9, at 593 (noting that the action in debt had fully evolved by the end of
the 12th century).
53. See J.B. Ames, Parol Contracts Prior to Assumpsit, 8 HARV. L. REV. 252, 252 (1894)
[hereinafter Ames, Parol Contracts] (characterizing the action in covenant, which allowed the
enforcement of promises made upon sealed instruments, as one ofthe contractualremedies that existed
before the introduction of assumpsit); see alsoJ.B. Ames, The History of.Assunpsit, 2 HARV. L. REV.
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general theory of contract law. The writ of debt required, among other
things, that a benefit previously have been conferred on the defendant.'
The writ of covenant had rigid formality requirements.'
By the first part of the seventeenth century, the writ of assumpsit,
through a series of extensions that began in the fourteenth century, would
become the vehicle for the English law's recognition that liability could be
founded upon a promise.' Throughout the period, however, both the
King's courts and Chancery decided cases with invocations to the standard
of good faith. As Professor Powell explains:
Several statutes provided summary remedies in local courts. But
these were inadequate, and many addressed petitions to the King,
praying that their adversaries might be compelled to perform their
contracts. Of course the words used by them vary a good deal; but
with ever-increasing monotony the plea is that the debtor has acted
'against good faith and conscience' or the petitioner prays that the
debtor shall be compelled to do 'what good faith and conscience
require.' Today, if you produce a will with a normal attestation
clause, you will usually get probate of the will in common form
without going to court. In the fifteenth century, in a similar way, the
use of the words 'good faith and conscience' was probably necessary,
not only to catch the eye of the Chancellor but also to put in his
hands the key with which he could without qualms open his court to
the petitioner. When the Chancellor dealt with the petition, he in
turn emphasised the duties of good faith and conscience-especially
conscience.5 7
2. Good faith after the triumph of assumpsit.-In the century and a
half after the triumph of assumpsit, the term "consideration" developed
into a test to measure whether facts existed to make a promise enforceable
under a writ of assumpsit. Accordingly, much of the history of contract
law during this period involves the history of the evolution of the
consideration doctrine. 8 During this period, however, some English
53, 56-57 (1888) [hereinafter Ames, Assumpsit] (noting that before the 15th century, an action in
covenant generally would not lie if an action in debt was available).
54. See Ames, Assumpsit, supra note 53, at 55 ("A single contract debt . . . was originally
conceived of, not as a contract, in the modem sense of the term, that is, as a promise, but as a
grant.").
55. See SIMPSON, supra note 52, at 22-25 (outlining the formal requirements of an action in
covenant).
56. See J.H. BAKER & S.F.C. MILSOM, SOURCES OF ENGLISH LEGAL HisToRY: PRIVATE LAW
TO 1750, at 482-505 (1986) (collecting cases, reports, and dialogues illustrating that liability can be
based on a promise).
57. Powell, supra note 45, at 22.
58. see BAKER & MILSOM, supra note 56, at 482, 505 (collecting 16th-century legal cases and
commentary that illustrate the development of the consideration doctrine in English law). See generally
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thinkers began to express opinions on the relationship between commercial
transactions and morality. These early writers typically stressed indivi-
dualism and emphasized the importance of the individual's conscience in
setting fair prices.5 9 These views were later refined and expanded in the
eighteenth century by David Hume and Adam Smith, each of whom, when
arguing that enlightened self-interest would prevent humankind from
degenerating into an anarchic state of nature, claimed that self-interest
would cause men to honor their promises more regularly as the number of
their promises increased.' In Professor Atiyah's words, both Smith and
Hume "seem to have seen enlightened self-interest as lying at the root, not
merely of the legal obligation to perform contracts, but also of the moral
obligation to observe promises." 1 To Smith and Hume, a virtual promise
to conduct oneself in good faith was implied in any promise, as Professor
Atiyah explains:
If it is enlightened self-interest which lies at the root of [promissory
or contractual] obligations, it is because promises and contracts invite
trust, involve reliance and dependence by others on the word of the
promisor. It is not, it seems, any inherent quality possessed by a
promise, nor is it because promises are expressions of the will.
... [T]o Adam Smith, it was the obligation not to disappoint
dependence or expectations which was the source of promissory obli-
gation.62
Consistent with this conception of the moral underpinnings of a pro-
mise, many contract disputes in this period were decided with reference to
principles of fairness. Most contract litigation took place in Chancery, and
"in and around 1770 it was .. the established tradition in Chancery that
a contract must basically be fair; or perhaps, to be strictly accurate, that a
grossly unfair contract was liable to be upset. " '
During the eighteenth century, it appeared that good faith might blos-
som into a broad principle of overarching significance in contract law.
W.S. Holdsworth, The Modem History of the Doctrine of Consideration, 2 B.U. L. REV. 87, 174
(1922) (discussing the "difficulties [that] have arisen in the process of translating" the requirements of
assumpsit into the new concept of consideration).
59. See P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 72-73 (1979) (discussing
the writing of Thomas Wilson, Richard Steele, Sir Dudley North, Sir Josiah Child, and Sir William
Petty).
60. DAVID HUME, A TREATISEON HuMAN NATURE479-80,bk. nM, pt. H, § I (L.A. Selby-Bigge
ed., Clarendon Press 1980) (1739-40); ADAM SMITH, LFCTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 538-39 (R.L.
Meek et al. eds., 1978) (1766).
61. ATIYAH, supra note 59, at 81.
62. Id. at 82-83. See SMITH, supra note 60, at 92-95 (arguing that promises should be enforced
when a'party depends on a promise and reasonably expects its performance).
63. ATIYAH, supra note 59, at 147; see id. at 173 (noting that the court of chancery would set
aside unfair bargains).
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Under the influence of Lord Mansfield, contract law briefly flirted with the
notion that a consideration was merely a moral obligation, or a mere mo-
tive or feeling that one was morally obligated." Lord Mansfield's view
of the duty of good faith insofar as it pertained to contract performance
was well illustrated by his opinion in Carter v. Boehm.' In Carter, an
action on an insurance policy in which the insurer set up the defense of
concealment, Lord Mansfield grounded his decision on an obligation of
good faith: "The governing principle is applicable to all contracts and
dealings. Good faith forbids either party by concealing what he privately
knows, to draw the other into a bargain, from his ignorance of that fact,
and his believing the contrary."' If Lord Mansfield's view had been
adopted, the doctrine of consideration would probably have become one of
several ways of evidencing a promise, rather than a substantive prerequisite
to a promise's enforcement. 67 Lord Mansfield's efforts to infuse the
common law with these equitable notions ultimately failed,68 but to this
day the rules for validating a promise still acknowledge special categories
64. In Trueman v. Fenton, the court held that a promise by a bankrupt to pay a creditor was
enforceable even though nothing was exchanged at the time of the promise. Trueman v. Fenton, 2
Cowp. 544, 98 Eng. Rep. 1232 (K.B. 1777). This case was consistent with existing precedents that
an old debt could be a sufficient consideration for a subsequentpromise. See SIMPSON, supra note 52,
at 456, 457 (explaining 16th century England's gradual recognition of contracts supported by past
consideration as an early example of courts enforcing promises that the parties "ought to" perform).
However, Lord Mansfield purported to rest the decision on a different ground, one that approaches the
theory that consideration was nothing more than a moral duty to do an act:
A bankrupt may undoubtedly contract new debts; therefore, if there is an objection to his
reviving an old debt by a new promise, it must be founded upon the ground of its being
nudum pactum. As to that, all the debts of a bankrupt are due in conscience,
notwithstanding he has obtained his certificate; and there is no honest man who does not
discharge them, if he afterwards has it in his power to do so. Though all legal remedy
may be gone, the debts are clearly not extinguished in conscience.
Trueman, 2 Cowp. at 548, 98 Eng. Rep. at 1234.
65. 3 Burr. 1907, 1910,97 Eng. Rep. 1162, 1164 (K.B. 1766), discussed in ATIYAH, supra note
59, at 168.
66. Id. at 1910, 97 Eng. Rep. at 1164.
67. See 8 Holdsworth, supra note 44, at 25, 25-30 (tracing the development of Lord Mansfield's
views and arguing that if they had been adopted, they would "have fundamentally altered the whole
theory of our law of contract").
68. The fatal blow to Lord Mansfield's vision of moral obligation serving as the prerequisite for
enforcing a promise was probably dealt in Rann v. Hughes, 4 Brown 27, 2 Eng. Rep. 18 (H.L. 1778).
In that case, the court expressly rejected the conclusion, announced by Lord Mansfield in Pillans v.
Van Mierop, 3 Burr. 1663, 1671, 97 Eng. Rep. 1035, 1039 (K.B. 1765), that a lack of consideration
would not render a promise unenforceable if the promise was reduced to writing so as to satisfy the
Statute of Frauds. Rann, 4 Brown at 30-31, 2 Eng. Rep. at 21. The court also rejected the argument
that a promise enforceable only in conscience without some consideration of fact is binding. Id. In
the 20th century, promissory estoppel, or reliance-based obligation-which has some connections to
good faith-has emerged as a substantive alternative to consideration. See JOHN S. CALAMAR1 &
JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 283, 272-92 (3d ed. 1987) (discussing situations in
which courts will accept promissory estoppel "as a substitute for consideration").
Texas Law Review
where promises are enforceable without either consideration or reliance.'
The consideration requirement ultimately evolved into a technical, sub-
stantive doctrine by which a promise is validated, but as applied, the
doctrine was tempered to benefit those who performed in good faith and
to restrain those who sought to secure unfair advantages in bad faith.'
3. Good faith in the era of classical economics.-The classical eco-
nomic era, which began in the late eighteenth century and continued
through the nineteenth century, is often identified with the doctrine of
caveat emptor, a doctrine that is frequently taken as evidence that courts
were not interested in the fairness. of contracts.71 This is somewhat
ironic: as noted earlier, Adam Smith, whose work The Wealth of Nations
is often credited with opening the classical period, very nearly recognized
explicitly the duty of good faith and fair dealing in every contract.'
Professor Atiyah, in his important work on the history of contract law after
1770, concludes that the law never abandoned the moral ideals of fairness
in contractual relationships:
The truth is .. .that the early nineteenth century saw little more
than a brief flirtation with the doctrine caveat emptor; from the
beginning this flirtation had to contend with serious opposition from
judges who still believed that it was part of the job of the Courts to
see that contracts were fair; and by the 1860s, at least in contracts of
sale of goods, these judges had won out, and the flirtation was over.
The common law had, in large part, returned to the traditions of
eighteenth-century Equity when the fairness of a contractual ex-
change was still an all-important part of contract law.73
69. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 82 (1979) (describing when a promise
to pay past indebtedness may be binding); id. § 83 (describing when a promise to pay indebtedness
discharged in bankruptcy may be binding); id. § 84 (describing when a promise to perform a duty
despite non-occurrenceof a condition may be binding); id. § 86 (describing when a subsequent promise
for a benefit already received may be binding); id. § 88 (describing when a promise to be a surety may
be binding).
70. Atiyah discusses the use of the consideration doctrine in the 17th and 18th centuries:
What we know of moral beliefs and principles... suggests that the fairness of exchange
would normally have been an important consideration to lawyers, and this was still a time
when the law of contract was being profoundly influenced by moral ideals. The doctrine
of consideration itself was a reflection of moral ideal, not of some amoral commercial
practices.
ATIYAH, supra note 59, at 147; see SIMPSON, supra note 52, at 485-88 ("[T]he doctrine of
consideration is indeed intensely moralistic, and we may disagree with some of its judgments; what is
mistaken is to fail to see that a good law of contract has as its function in relation to the commercial
world the imposition of decent moral standards.").
71. ATIYAH, supra note 59, at 178-79.
72. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
73. ATIYAH, supra note 59, at 479.
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C. American Law
1. Early uses of good faith.-The concept of good faith entered
American common law in roughly the same mold in which it appeared in
English common law in the late eighteenth century. American courts
embraced the doctrine of caveat emptor with more enthusiasm than their
English counterparts,74 but the moralistic notion that contracting parties
owe good faith duties to each other never disappeared from American
decisions.
It appears that most late nineteenth-century treatises on contract law,
whose writers were presumably familiar with a century of precedents, did
not emphasize the principle that a party to a contract must perform in good
faith. Instead, these writers, if they mentioned good faith at all, usually
discussed the unfairness of fraud, which they were inclined to equate with
a lack of good faith.'5 While these writers might be read as evidence that
good faith was relegated to a lesser status during the classical economic
era, other writers during this period articulated a more broadly based duty
of good faith in terms that could as easily have been written a century
later. Perhaps the most explicit recognition of the duty appears in the 1878
treatise Bishop on Contracts:
When parties enter into a contract in terms, the law presumes each
of them to be acting in good faith toward the other; and it binds each
to the other, to whatever good faith requires. The implication may
be derived from the words employed, from the acts of the parties
74. Id. at 180; see also MORTON J. HORWrTz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMRICAN LAW, 1780-
1860, at 180 (1977) (discussing the foundation in English common law doctrine of caveat emptor and
its subsequent adoption in American courts).
75. The discussion in William Story's treatise provides an example:
No agreement although it be apparently fair, and in compliance with the formalities of
law, can be enforced, if it be essentially unfair, and fraudulent.... And unless it be
made in good faith, and free from the stain of fraud and imposition, it will be spumed
from the threshold of every legal tribunal.
WILLIAM W. STORY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 596 (Boston, Little, Brown and Co.,
4th ed. 1856). For additional examples, see CHARLES F. BEACH, A TREATISE ON THE MODERN LAW
OF CONTRACTS 1784- 85 (Indianapolis & Kansas City, The Bowen-Merrill Co. 1896) ("[ If the contract
was free from any fraud or bad faith, and was otherwise fair and reasonable, except that what the infant
paid was in excess of the value of what he received, he can only recover such excess."); 1 WILLIAM
F. ELLIOTr, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §70, at 98 (1913) ("Fraud as to material
matter will vitiate, or render voidable any contract, for good faith is to this extent, at least, one of the
essential elements of an agreement." (footnotes omitted)); 2 FRANCIS WHARTON, A COMMENTARY ON
THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 654 (Philadelphia, Kay and Brother 1882) ("If a contract is open to two
probable constructions, one of which would impute fraud or illegal purpose to one of the parties, while
the other construction would be free from such taint, the latter construction will be adopted."). See
also Louis L. HAMMON, THE GENERAL PRiNciPLEs OF THE LAw OF CONTRACT § 397, at 792 (1902)
("[I]n case a contract is susceptible of two constructions, the court will so construe it as to make it just
and reasonable as between the parties, if that course can be taken without violating the evident intention
of the parties, or infringing upon rules of law.").
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viewed in connection with the thing contracted about, or from the
nature of the transaction.
76
At the turn of the twentieth century, reported decisions regularly
referred to good faith as one of the implied obligations of the parties to a
contract.' Exemplary of these early decisions is Industrial & General
Trust v. Tod,78 in which the New York Court of Appeals held that a rail-
road reorganization commission's delegated authority to construe the
reorganization agreement was not unlimited:
No one can be made by contract the final judge of his own acts, for
the law writes "good faith" into such agreements. No covenant of
immunity can be drawn that will protect a person who acts in bad
faith, because such a stipulation is against public policy, and the
courts will not enforce it. The law requires the exercise of good
faith, and, no matter how strong the provision to shield from liability
may be, there is no protection unless good faith is observed.79
In cases where one party's duty to perform was conditioned on that party's
satisfaction with the other party's earlier rendered performance, courts held
that a refusal to accept the performance must be based on a good faith
76. JOEL P. BISHOP, BISHOP ON CoNTRACTs § 106, at 37-38 (St. Louis, F.H. Thomas & Co.
1878). Similar principles were articulated in another late-19th century treatise:
[Tihe law, in order to promote good faith and make men act up to the spirit as well as
to the letter of their engagements, will create and supply, as a necessary result and
consequence of the contract, certain covenants and obligations, which bind the parties as
forcibly and effectually as if they had been expressed in the strongest and most explicit
terms in the deed itself.
3 CHARLES G. ADDISON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACr 1400, at 492 (Jersey City, Fred.
D. Linn & Co., James A. Morgan ed. 1883).
77. See, e.g., Chicago Mun. Gas-Light & Fuel Co. v. Town of Lake, 22 N.E. 616, 619 (III.
1889) (discussing the principle that where a party seeks specific performance, the complainant must
show that the "contract has been fully and fairly, in good faith, performed"); Ruggles v. Merritt, 132
N.W. 112, 114 (Mich. 1911) (finding that the duty of legal representatives is to fulfill their contractual
obligations "in good faith"); Crouch v. Gutman, 31 N.E. 271, 273 (N.Y. 1892) (finding that as a
condition of substantial completion of the contract despite defects in performance, the "builder must
in good faith [have] intended to comply with the contract'); Armstrong v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 29
N.E. 991, 992 (N.Y. 1892) (requiring of an insurer "entire good faith and fair dealing in its
transactions" with the insured when the insured is obligated to provide proof of loss); Duryea v.
Bliven, 25 N.E. 908, 908-09 (N.Y. 1890) (explaining, with respect to settlement agreement following
divorce, "[a] contract of this character is incapable of the exact performance which may be made of
a business one, but, nevertheless, both parties are required to attempt to carry it out in good faith");
Serfass v. Driesbach, 21 A. 523, 524 (Pa. 1891) (stating that before plaintiffs can recover on the
contract, they must prove that they "had performed, in good faith, substantially, all the covenants and
stipulations contained in this contract"); Bond v. Terrell Cotton & Woolen Mfg. Co., 82 Tex. 309,
311-12, 18 S.W. 691, 692 (1891) (stating that if a party has received from a corporation the benefit
of "a contract fully performed in good faith by it," then that party must discharge its obligations under
the contract).
78. 73 N.E. 7 (N.Y. 1905).
79. Id. at 9.
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objection.' As one court explained, "if A. agrees to make something for
B., to meet the Approval of B. ... , B. may reject it for any objection
which is made in good faith, and is not merely capricious."" Other cases
announced the general principle that every contract contains an implied
duty of good faith and fair dealing between the parties.' Typical of these
cases is Brassil v. Maryland Casualty Co.,'a in which the New York
Court of Appeals held that the insured could recover from the insurer his
expenses of prosecuting an appeal that the insurer had refused to take from
an adverse judgment against the insured:
[I]t is enough to say that it would be a reproach to the law if there
were no remedy for so obvious a wrong as was inflicted upon this
plaintiff. His rights ... go deeper than the mere surface of the
contract written for him by the defendant. Its stipulations imposed
obligations based upon those principles of fair dealing which enter
into every contract. Even defendant has invoked [in its answer] this
implied obligation of good faith and fair dealing not expressed in the
written terms of its written contract.... If [it were the plaintiff's
duty to deal fairly and in good faith with the defendant,] it was not
less the correlative obligation of the defendant to "deal fairly and in
good faith" with him."
Despite considerable support for the existence of a duty of good faith
contract performance in the early twentieth century, the American Law
Institute, which undertook to draft the Restatement (First) of Contracts in
80. See, e.g., Doll v. Noble, 22 N.E. 406, 407 (N.Y. 1889) (holding that the defendant could not
defeat recovery under a contract providing for work to be done in the best workmanlike manner by
asserting in bad faith that the work was not done to his satisfaction); Baltimore & O.R. Co. v. Brydon,
3 A. 306, 309-10 (Md. 1886) (holding that a purchaser must exercise good faith in refusing the
delivery of coal when under the contract, the purchaser could refuse coal that it deemed unsatisfactory);
$ingerly v. Thayer, 2 A. 230, 233 (Pa. 1885) (holding that a refusal to accept an elevator on the
ground that is was not satisfactory must be made in good faith and must not be capricious); Thomas
v. Fleury, 26 N.Y. 26, 34 (1862) (holding that although a building contract made an architect's
certificate a condition precedent to payment, the builder could recover when the architect in bad faith
refused the certificate).
81. Singerly, 2 A. at 233.
82. See, e.g., Ratzlaff v. Trainor-Desmond Co., 183 P. 269, 271 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1919)
(holding that a seller of land may not in bad faith seek a cancellation of a sale contract in order to
frustrate the payment of a commission to the sale broker); People ex rel. Wells & Newton Co. v.
Craig, 133 N.E. 419, 426 (N.Y. 1921) (implying a good faith obligation to allow a timely opportunity
to complete a contracted job); Wigand v. Bachmann-Bechtel Brewing Co., 118 N.E. 618, 619 (N.Y.
1918) (implying a good faith duty not to shut down operations in order to avoid the obligation of an
output contract); Simon v. Etgen, 107 N.E. 1066, 1067 (N.Y. 1915) (implying a good faith duty to
sell a building when the proceeds from the sale were obligated to be paid as part of a settlement
agreement); Hilleary v. Skookum Root Hair-Grower Co., 23 N.Y.S. 1016, 1018 (Com. P1. 1893)
(holding that ambiguous language in a personal services contract must be resolved in a manner implying
good faith by both parties).
83. 104 N.E. 622 (N.Y. 1914).
84. Id. at 624.
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the 1920s, did not give explicit recognition to an implied duty of good faith
and fair dealing.' Indeed, the Restatement (First) made no mention of
it. But this did not lessen the principle's acceptance. A 1933 New York
Court of Appeals decision, Kirke La Shelle Co. v. Paul Armstrong Co., 8
articulated the duty in this way:
[I]n every contract there is an implied covenant that neither party
shall do anything which will have the effect of destroying or injuring
the right of the other party to receive the fruits of the contract, which
means that in every contract there exists an implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing.'
2. Developing a unified theory of goodfaith.-By the mid-twentieth
century, some commentators began to realize that a common thread linked
the various settings in which courts resorted to the principle of good faith
to dispose of cases, and it was in this period that the first efforts to state
a unified theory of good faith performance emerged. Somewhat fortui-
tously, the doctrine of good faith performance appeared in the first drafts
of the Uniform Commercial Code.88 Section 1-203 of the 1952 official
draft provided that "[e]very contract within this Act imposes an obligation
of good faith in its performance or enforcement, " " and thirteen other
sections in Article 2 explicitly required good faith in transactions for the
sale of goods.'
85. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS (1932); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 231 reporter's note (Tentative Draft No. 5, 1970) (noting that the Draft included a duty of good faith
and fair dealing in the Restatement for the first time).
86. 188 N.E. 163 (N.Y. 1933).
87. Id. at 167.
88. Section 242 of the German Civil Code, one of the most famous and important of all
pronouncements on good faith, is important to this history. The Section is a simple, one-sentence
statement: "The debtor is bound to effect performance according to the requirements of good faith,
giving consideration to common usage." THE GERMAN CIVIL CODE § 242 (Ian S. Forrester et al.
trans., 1975). It is now recognized "as a statutory enactment of a general requirement of good faith,
a 'principle of legal ethics,' which dominates the entire [German] legal system." NORBERT HORN ET
AL., GERMAN PRIVATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 135 (Tony Weir trans., 1982).
Professor Karl Llewellyn was the Chief Reporter for the Uniform Commercial Code, and he was very
familiar with § 242. Thus, it is fair to say that the good faith principle that appeared in § 1-203 had
its strongest roots in good faith's civil law heritage. See John P. Dawson, Unconscionable Coercion:
The Genran Vision, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1041, 1044 (1976) (noting that U.C.C. § 1-203 is the "twin
sister" of § 242 of the German Civil Code). This suggests another observation: To the extent good
faith in the Anglo-American tradition and good faith in the civil law share Roman law's notions of good
faith as common ancestry, the twentieth-century connection between § 1-203 and the civil law arguably
marks a return to common ground.
89. U.C.C. § 1-203 (Official Draft 1952).
90. Id. §§ 2-103,2-306,2-325,2-328,2-401,2-402,2-403,2-506,2-603,2-615, 2-702,2-706,
2-712.
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The drafters of the Code conceived of good faith as an aspect of bona
fide purchase,9" a doctrine in which good faith is used to describe the
state of mind of a buyer; in this context, good faith refers to whether the
buyer took goods without notice, knowledge, or suspicion of an irregularity
in the transaction.' The broader legal significance of good faith as a
standard for performance or enforcement of a contract was noticed in the
mid-1960s, when commentators began to discuss the significance of the
duty of good faith implied in every contract for the sale of goods. In
1963, Professor Farnsworth published a brief article on the relationship and
origins of the good faith purchase and good faith performance requirements
of the Uniform Commercial Code." Professor Summers followed in
1968 with an important article on the duty of good faith, both in general
contract law and under the Code.'
Courts continued to refer to good faith and fair dealing in contract
performance," and by 1970, the American Law Institute's tentative draft
of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts contained a section on good faith
and fair dealing.' This section ultimately became Section 205 in the
official Restatement, which was adopted in May 1979.Y Section 205 pro-
vides that "[e]very contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith
and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement."" Section 205
includes a comment titled "Meanings of 'good faith,'" but the comment
provides no precise statement of the substantive content of the duty.99
91. Robert S. Summers, 'Good Faith' in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. RV. 195, 208 & n.53 (1968).
92. See Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance, supra note 44, at 668 (noting that under the "good
faith purchase" provisions of the U.C.C., a "party is advantaged only if he acted with innocent
ignorance or lack of suspicion").
93. Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance, supra note 44 (tracing the development of good faith
purchase and good faith performance and arguing that courts should interpret good faith provisions of
the U.C.C. under an objective standard of commercial reasonableness).
94. Summers, supra note 91, at 196 (arguing that good faith performance is a phrase that has no
meaning of its own, "but which serves to exclude many heterogeneous forms of bad faith").
95. See, e.g., Ventura v. Colgrove, 75 Cal. Rptr. 495,498 (Ct. App. 1969) ("Ilmplied covenants
within said alleged contract . .. of fair dealings and good faith did create a duty of express
disclosure."); Colwell Co. v. Hubert, 56 Cal. Rptr. 753, 759 (Ct. App. 1967) ("[11n every contract
there is an implied covenant that neither party shall do anything which will have the effect of destroying
or injuring the right of the other party to receive the fruits of the contract, which means that in every
contract there exists an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing."); Jos. H. Carter, Inc. v.
Carter, 127 N.Y.S.2d 518 (Sup. Ct. 1953) (referring to a defendant's obligation "to faithfully and in
good faith and fair dealing perform and discharge his obligations and duties under the contract"), aft'd,
129 N.Y.S.2d 898 (App. Div. 1954); Ekstrom v. Wisconsin, 172 N.W.2d 660, 661 (Wis. 1969)
("Every contract implies good faith and fair dealing between the parties to it, and a duty of co-operation
on the part of both parties." (quoting 17 AM. JUI. 2D Contracts § 256, at 653 (1964))).
96. RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcrs § 231 (Tentative Draft No. 5, 1970).





The comment repeats the definitions of good faith found in the Uniform
Commercial Code,1" stopping short of offering these definitions as
dispositive. The comment proceeds:
The phrase "good faith" is used in a variety of contexts, and its
meaning varies somewhat with the context. Good faith performance
or enforcement of a contract emphasizes faithfulness to an agreed
common purpose and consistency with the justified expectations of
the other party; it excludes a variety of types of conduct charac-
terized as involving "bad faith" because they violate community
standards of decency, fairness or reasonableness. The appropriate
remedy for a breach of the duty. of good faith also varies with the
circumstances. 101
Improving upon the foregoing conceptualization of good faith is dif-
ficult. Some commentators have criticized the vagueness of the good faith
standard,"°2 a perhaps inevitable development in light of the near
tautological qualities of any definition of good faith. Professor Summers,
whose writings on the subject of the duty of good faith were highly
influential in the drafting of Section 205, believes that stating a unified
positive meaning of good faith is unnecessary and probably futile."°3
Instead, Professor Summers recommends conceptualizing good faith as an
"excluder" by contrasting good faith with the kinds of bad faith that are
ruled out in particular settings."' This approach, he argues, is adequate
to make the principle of good faith useful in the very sense that rules of
law are useful.1 5
Concerned that courts may "overextend" the meaning of good faith,
thereby disrupting the predictability and certainty of commercial dealings,
and that the absence of a unified conceptualization of good faith will mean
100. Id. cmt. a (quoting U.C.C. § 1-201(19) (1991) ("Good faith is defined... as 'honesty in
fact in the conduct or transaction concerned.'"); id. § 2-103(1)(b) ("'Good faith' in the case of a
merchant means honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing
in the trade.")).
101. Id.
102. See, e.g., Clayton P. Gillette, Limitations on the Obligation of Good Faith, 1981 DUKE_ L.J.
619, 642-47 (arguing that the vagueness inherent in the term "good faith" results in disagreements over
its requirements and interferes with the performance of contracts); cf. Patricia K. Gillette, The Implied
Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing: Are Employers the Insurers of the Eighties?, I 1 EMPLOYEE
REL. L.J. 438, 449-50 (1985-86) (discussing the problems in determining standards fbr the breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the employment context); Patricia A. Milon,
Recent Development, Implied Covenants of Good Faith and Fair Dealing: Loose Cannons of Liability
for Financial Institutions?, 40 VAND. L. REv. 1197, 1230-31 (1987) (noting the ambiguity of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing as applied to financial institutions).
103. Summers, supra note 90, at 206.
104. Id. at 201-02. Note that the word "excludes" is contained in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CoNTRAcTs § 205 cmt. a (1979).
105. Summers, supra note 90, at 264-65.
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that the conduct of almost any party to almost any contract may be vulner-
able to claims of bad faith, Professor Burton has conceptualized good faith
from a "cost perspective," reasoning that the "good faith performance
doctrine... directs attention to the opportunities forgone by a discretion-
exercising party at [contract] formation, and to that party's reasons for
exercising discretion during performance.""
However one assesses this debate" and the perspectives of other
commentators, 108 the fact remains that the duty of good faith and fair
dealing has ancient lineage. Reading this history from the most skeptical
of perspectives, one could assert that during a relatively brief period in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the duty was relegated a lesser role in
commercial dealings, but even such a skeptic would have to admit that the
twentieth century has witnessed a revival that rediscovers the doctrine's
historical roots.
II. Bad Faith and Insurance
By the early 1980s, many courts had concluded that an insurer's
breach of the duty to defend, the duty to settle, or the duty to pay proceeds
constituted bad faith, and that this bad faith performance of the contract
constituted a tort.1o9
106. Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith,
94 HARV. L. REV. 369, 372-73 (1980). Professor Burton argues that:
[blad faith performance occurs precisely wben discretion is used to recapture opportunities
forgone upon contracting-when the discretion-exercising party refuses to pay the
expected cost of performance. Good faith performance, in turn, occurs when a party's
discretion is exercised for any purpose within the reasonable contemplation of the parties
at the time of formation-to capture opportunities that were preserved upon entering the
contract, interpreted objectively.
id. at 373.
107. See StevenJ. Burton, Good Faith Performance of a Contract Within Article 2 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 67 IOWA L. REV. 1, 5-6 (1981) (suggesting an approach to good faith that focuses
on the discretion-exercising party's motivations and the dependent party's expectations); Robert S.
Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith-Its Recognition and Conceptualization, 67 COPNELL L.
REV. 810, 818-21 (1982) (arguing that good faith can be defined only by a nonexclusive list of what
it does not mean); Steven J. Burton, More in Good Faith Performance of a Contract: A Reply to
Professor Summers, 69 IOWA L. REV. 497, 500 (1984) (defining good faith as the situation in which
the party with discretion exercises it only to capture alternative opportunities that were preserved at the
time of contracting).
108. See Eric G. Andersen, Good Faith in the Enforcement of Contracts, 73 IOWA L. REV. 299,
324-25 (1988) (arguing that good faith depends on the effects of a party's acts in performance, not the
motivations behind them); H. Walter Croskey, Bad Faith in Calfornia: Its History, Development and
Current Status, 26 TORT & INs. LJ. 561, 573-80 (1991) (citing reasonableness as a key component
of good faith and listing over 20 specific duties imposed on insurers by the common law implied
covenant of good faith); Michael H. Cohen, Comment, Reconstructing Breach of the Implied Covenant
of Good Faith and Fair Dealing as a Tort, 73 CAL. L. REv. 1291, 1302 (1985) (defining bad faith as
the obstruction of the other party's interest in receiving compensation for a breach).
109. See, e.g., Noble v. National Am. Life Ins. Co., 624 P.2d 866, 873-79 (Ariz. 1981)
(recognizing and defining the tort of bad faith refusal to pay proceeds); Comunale v. Traders & Gen.
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The rationales of these decisions vary greatly, but the common theme
is that insurance policies are different from ordinary commercial contracts,
and contractual remedies are inadequate in this setting to balance the
interests of insurer and insured fairly."' Unfortunately, just as today we
lack data to assess the extent to which the tort of bad faith has skewed
ratemaking, underwriting, claims processing, and defense and settlement
of third-party claims,"' in the early 1980s no one had data clearly
demonstrating contract law's inability to deter insurer misconduct and fairly
compensate aggrieved insureds. In other words, the orienteer, before
merrily marching on her way, did not take the time to read the compass
carefully, and many followed her.
Hindsight has its benefits, and from the perspective of the wrong side
of the mountain, it is easy to understand how we arrived at our current
location, even if we do not know where to go. In many respects, the
potential of contract law to respond to insurer overreaching was simply not
understood, and the choice was made to remedy insurers' bad faith
breaches in tort. Having heard it argued in the halls of academia that
contract law cannot deter insurers' bad faith breaches or compensate
insureds adequately because it has no mechanism for giving an excess
judgment when the insurer has breached the duty to defend or the duty to
settle,"' I suspect this same argument has been made before trial courts,
Ins. Co., 328 P.2d 198 (Cal. 1958) (holding that breaches of the duty to defend and the duty to settle
are two distinct torts even when committed simultaneously); Zumwaltv. Utilities Ins. Co., 228 S.W.2d
750, 753-55 (Mo. 1950) (distinguishing between the negligent refusal to settle, for which the insurer
cannot be held liable beyond the policy limits, and the bad faith refusal to settle, for which it can);
Smith v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 294 N.W.2d 751, 755-56 (N.D. 1980) (recognizing the
refusal to defend as a tort); Santilli v. State Farm Life Ins. Co., 562 P.2d 965, 969 (Or. 1977)
(referring to the tort of an insurer's bad faith refusal to settle within the coverage limits); Anderson v.
Continental Ins. Co., 271 N.W.2d 368, 373-79 (Wis. 1978) (recognizing and defining the tort of bad
faith refusal to pay proceeds).
110. See, e.g., Hiatt v. Schreiber, 599 F. Supp. 1142, 1145 (D. Colo. 1984) ("[Ain insurance
policy between an insured and a vendor requires different remedies [than standard contract
remedies]."); Rodgers v. Pennsylvania Life Ins. Co., 539 F. Supp. 879, 883 (S.D. Iowa 1982) ("The
superior bargaining power of an insurance company over its insured has long been recognized in
Iowa."); Noble v. National Am. Life Ins. Co., 624 P.2d 866, 867 (Ariz. 1981) ("The special nature
of an insurance contract has been recognized by courts and legislatures for many years."); Crisci v.
Security Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173, 179 (Cal. 1967) ("Plaintiff did not seek by the contract involved here
to obtain a commercial advantage but to protect herself against the risks of accidental losses."); Grand
Sheet Metal Prods. Co. v. Protection Mut. Ins. Co., 375 A.2d 428, 430 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1977)
("IT]he unequal bargaining power of the parties, the special nature of the insurance business, and the
disastrous economic effects that a bad faith refusal to pay may cause the insured are paramount
considerations."); Bibeault v. Hanover Ins. Co., 417 A.2d 313, 318 (R.I. 1980) ("Recovery under a
contract theory alone ... effectively guards an insurer's pocketbook against any threat of punitive
damages.").
111. See Abraham, supra note 1, at 1313 (noting an absence of quantitative analysis of the eost
to insurers of paying claims of marginal quality merely to avoid allegations of bad faith).
112. The former colleague, a professor of torts, who made this argument shall be allowed to
remain anonymous.
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the trenches where the wars are fought. The argument, of course, is
wrong. Contract law, in addition to giving damages for loss of the bar-
gain"' (in this case, the insurer's promise to pay proceeds), awards
consequential damages in appropriate cases. 4 The excess judgment that
results from an insurer's failure to defend or settle a claim in circumstances
in which it should do so is a natural, foreseeable consequence of the
breach-in other words, precisely the kind of loss for which contract law
gives a remedy. But we cannot know easily to what extent this basic point
was forgotten by the trial courts that assembled the records that were later
reviewed on appeal by courts that substituted a different rationale but
nevertheless sustained the lower courts' rejection of the contract paradigm.
Unlike the duty to defend, the duty to settle is not stated in so many
words in the typical liability insurance policy." 5 Moreover, the insurer
is not obligated to settle every claim within coverage but is obligated to act
reasonably in response to settlement offers."16 To differentiate between
reasonable and unreasonable insurer conduct, one must have a standard,
and courts often and understandably used phrases such as "due care,"
"negligence," "good faith," or "reasonableness" to demarcate proper and
improper responses to a settlement offer in the context of a particular
case." 7 Each of these phrases sounds as if the tort paradigm is being
invoked, and it is only a small step to the conclusion that the insurer's
negligence, failure to use due care, unreasonable behavior, or bad faith
must be a tort. But this presumes that the duty to settle is a tort duty,
when it makes just as much sense to treat the duty to settle as a sub-duty
of the broader duty to defend, under the reasoning that responding to or
making settlement offers is one aspect of carrying out the contractually
based duty to defend.1 '
Because the duty to settle does not appear in explicit language in the
typical liability policy, it was easy to assert that the duty to settle must be
113. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 12.9, at 879 (2d ed. 1990).
114. Id. § 12.9, at 880.
115. Compare ROBERT H. JERRY, II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW § Ill[a] (1987) ("'The
duty to defend is a contractual obligation arising out of the language of the policy itself.") with id. §
112 ("MThe typical liability insurance policy has no language requiring the insurer to settle a lawsuit
brought against the insured.").
116. Id. § 112.
117. See, e.g., Bollinger v. Nuss, 449 P.2d 502,508 (Kan. 1969) (good faith); Radio Taxi Serv.,
Inc. v. Lincoln Mut. Ins. Co., 157 A.2d 319, 322 (NJ. 1960) (good faith); Trotter v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 377 S.E.2d 343, 349 (S.C. Ct. App. 1988) (reasonableness); Whatley v. City of
Dallas, 758 S.W.2d 301, 308 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, writ denied) (reasonable care); Tyler v.
Grange Ins. Ass'n, 473 P.2d 193, 199 (Wash. Ct. App. 1970) (good faith and ordinary care).
118. This is, in fact, how courts in what was, until recently, my home state of Kansas have
resolved this issue. Guarantee Abstract & Title Co. v. Interstate Fire & Casualty Co., 652 P.2d 665,
667 (Kan. 1982); see Robert H. Jerry, I, Recent Developments in Kansas Insurance Law: A Survey,
Some Analysis, and Some Suggestions, 32 KAN. L. REV. 287, 300-05 (1984) (analyzing the Guarantee
decision and an insurer's sub-duty to defend).
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"implied in law." The same could be said of the duty of good faith. With
due respect for the Romans,119 contracting parties do not normally insert
into their agreements an express provision that they will act in good faith.
As such, it was a small step to the assertion that the duty of good faith,
because it is not normally part of an express agreement, must be implied
by courts-that is, implied by law. If one clouds the issue further with an
assumption that duties expressed by the parties are contract duties, and
duties implied by law are tort duties,1" one can easily turn the duty to
settle and the duty of good faith and fair dealing into tort duties. This is,
of course, illogical; courts imply terms in contracts for all kinds of
reasons, and these implied terms create contract duties, not tort duties.
Because liability policies promise the insured a defense of a covered
claim, the contractual undertaking of the insurer is fundamentally a promise
to act as a fiduciary, and breaches of fiduciary duties can be remedied in
tort."' From this, it is a small step to the conclusion that the insurer's
breach of its contractual undertaking, given its fiduciary aspects, must give
rise to a tort claim." Contract law, however, does not require this
119. See supra text accompanying notes 15-26.
120. See Findley v. Time Ins. Co., 573 S.W.2d 908, 908 (Ark. 1978) ("[A]n insurance company,
in addition to its liability on the contract, may also be liable to its insured in tort for breach of an
implied duty to deal fairly and in good faith with the insured in the settlement of a claim under the
policy."); Grand Sheet Metal Prods. Co. v. Protection Mut. Ins. Co., 375 A.2d 428, 430 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 1977) ("The duty violated arises not from the ternis of the insurance contract but is a duty
imposed by law, the violation of which is a tort."); Mauldin v. Sheffer, 150 S.E.2d 150, 154 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1966) ("[11n order to maintain an action ex delicto because of a breach of duty growing out of
a contractual relation the breach must be shown to have been a breach of a duty imposed by law and
not merely the breach of a duty imposed by the contract itself."); Palmieri, supra note 8, at 105
(arguing that the duty of good faith "has become the object of a tug-of-war between those who seek
its restriction to the realm of contract law.., and those who envision the duty as the source of a tort
remedy," and that the duty of good faith "is a duty imposed by law, and is outside the contractual
freedom of the parties").
121. See, e.g., Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 486 (Cal. 1990) (providing a
cause of action for the breach of a doctor's fiduciary duty to a patient); Destefano v. Grabrian, 763
P.2d 275, 289 (Colo. 1988) (Quinn, CJ., concurring) (emphasizing that the breach of a fiduciary duty
lies in tort); Broadway Nat'l Bank v. Barton-Russell Corp., 585 N.Y.S.2d 933, 945 (Sup. Ct. 1992)-
("Pleading a fiduciary duty is appropriate where a plaintiff, even if claiming a breach of contract,
desires a remedy in tort for betrayal and breach of trust."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 874
cmt. b (1979) ("A fiduciary who commits a breach of his duty as a fiduciary is guilty of tortious
conducts to the person for whom he should act.... [I]rrespective of [whether the action is in equity
or at law], the beneficiary is entitled to tort damages for harm caused by breach of a duty arising from
the [fiduciary] relation."); 2 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITY-RESTITUTION,
§ 10.4, at 668 (2d ed. 1993) ("[A] breach of fiduciary relationship ... can amount to a tort .... ).
122. See Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 840 P.2d 130, 137-38 (Utah Ct. App.
1992) ("In the third-party context ... the insurer owes a 'fiduciary duty to its insured . ...,
Accordingly, Utah law allows an insured to sue an insurer in tort to remedy a violation of that duty."
(citation omitted)); Farris v. United States Fidelity and Guar. Co., 587 P.2d 1015, 1019 (Or. 1978)
("[Tihe insurance company is charged with acting in a fiduciary capacity as an attorney in fact
representing the insured's interest in litigation.... [Alrguably, acting in its own interests to the
detriment of the insured's interest while acting in such a fiduciary capacity is a tort.").
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answer. The insurer promises to provide a defense, and while one might
use a tort standard to determine when the duty has been breached, it does
not follow that the remedy for the breach must be in tort."
The more substantial issue is the economic one. A court looking at
a set of facts in which the insurer has intentionally taken a position on
coverage, defense, or settlement that causes serious harm and distress to
the insured is ripe for being convinced that contract remedies are insuf-
ficient to deter this kind of insurer overreaching, and that the insurer's
breach of contract must be treated as a tort, or else the insurer will have
"too little incentive to perform because the contract would be under-
enforced."" These arguments have a persuasive ring: The insurer de-
clined to defend, knowing that if it were later found to have breached this
duty, the contract damages would be the cost of defense, which is what the
insurer would have expended anyway. The insurer declined to pay, know-
ing that if it were later found to have breached this duty, the contract
damages would be the insured's loss, which is what the insurer would have
paid anyway. The insurer declined to settle, and the risk to the insurer of
an excess judgment was, by itself, insufficient to deter the insurer from
trading on the insured's economic (and perhaps emotional) well-being. The
argument concludes as follows: By offering the insured a remedy in tort,
in which contract law's limitations on consequential damages are liberalized
and punitive damages are available, the balance is shifted to protect the
insured and deter the insurer from overreaching.
Contract law, however, is not so unsympathetic to the insured's plight.
Contract law will provide the insured with a remedy for loss of bar-
gain,"25 meaning that the insurer will have to provide a substitutional
remedy equal in value to the performance it promised and did not deliver,
whether this be defense costs or payment of proceeds. Contract law will
provide the insured with a remedy for consequential loss,"~ meaning that
the insurer will pay for the excess judgment resulting from the failure to
settle. I have argued elsewhere that emotional distress resulting from an
insurer's nonperformance is foreseeable at the time of contracting in many
insurance transactions, 27 and contract law is flexible enough, if properly
applied, to provide a remedy for this kind of loss. Finally, if one fears the
123. See Powers, supra note 3, at 1230 n.71 (arguing that contract law should control the
computation of damages in bad faith cases).
124. Mark Gergen, A Cautionary Tale About Contractual Good Faith in Texas, 72 TEX. L. REV.
1235, 1251 (1994).
125. FARNsWORTH, supra note 113, § 12.9, at 879.
126. Id. § 12.9, at 880.
127. Robert H. Jerry, II, Remedying Insurers'Bad Faith Contract Performance: A Reassessment,
18 CONN. L. REV. 271, 298-301 (1986) (pointing out that not only are insurers aware that insurance
protects against the emotional distress that accompanies financial loss, but that they also emphasize the
emotional effects of casualties in marketing insurance policies).
1994] 1341
Texas Law Review
open-ended nature of emotional distress damages due to difficulties of
calculation, or if one still considers contract law too limited to deter
insurers' breaches when an obligation to perform is owed, a minor repair
of contract law's remedial scheme is possible. Many states permit the
aggrieved insured to recover attorneys' fees when the insurer fails to pay
proceeds, and this permission could be extended to the insured who suc-
cessfully claims that the insurer has breached the duty to defend or
settle. "'28 If one more turn of the ratchet is needed, a liquidated statutory
penalty, which is found in some states, could be added to the underlying
contractual remedy.1 9
Because I agree with Professor Powers that tort law is not a co-equal
paradigm with contract law,1" I conclude that tort law has infringed upon
contract law's rightful territory. When the tort of bad faith emerged, its
proponents were not forced to carry the burden of showing that the contract
paradigm was incapable of fairly balancing the interests of insurer and
insured. The tort was blessed despite a two-thousand-year tradition recog-
nizing the duty of good faith to be first, foremost, and fundamentally a
contractual undertaking and providing contract remedies for its breach.
I. Some Thoughts on the Future of Bad Faith
I agree with Professor Abraham that the climate of bad faith liability
seems calmer now than in the past."' But if we have adjusted our be-
havior in ways that make profound environmental changes seem less impor-
tant than they were ten, twenty, or thirty years ago, we could easily
overestimate the magnitude of the climate's shift. In other words, it is
difficult to know to what extent the climate has changed and to what extent
we now dress differently to deal with changed weather.
Professor Abraham is clearly correct that ERISA preemption of com-
mon law tort and contract actions has reduced bad faith litigation. But
ERISA's preemptive power may not be secure indefinitely. With respect
to employer-provided health benefits in particular, the Clinton Administra-
tion's proposed National Health Security Act 33 apparently would limit
ERISA's preemptive effect to employers and health benefit plans in
128. See id. at 319-20 (arguing that an expansion of the existing statutory remedies would deter
breaches of the duty to defend or settle); Gergen, supra note 124, at 1252 (observing that "fee-shifting
increases the expected cost of a breach to a promisor").
129. See Gergen, supra note 124, at 1255-56 (citing Texas's 18 % statutory penalty rate as one of
the most effective ways to protect insureds). To borrow from Professor Powers, rather than supplant
the contract paradigm with a tort paradigm, one should append a regulatory paradigm to the contract
paradigm. Powers, supra note 3, at 1231 n.74.
130. Powers, supra note 3, at 1224.
131. Abraham, supra note 1, at 1295.
132. id. at 1298-1300.
133. S. 1757, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993), available in LEXIS, Legis Library, BILLS File.
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corporate alliances, meaning that ERISA would not preempt employers and
insurers operating through regional alliances."t This would mean that
employees of companies with less than 5000 employees would be able to
pursue bad faith claims against insurers of these plans in state court.135
Whether the Clinton plan or this aspect of it will ever come to pass is an
open question, and health care benefit plans are only one part of a much
larger landscape, but the Clinton initiative reminds us of the tenuous nature
of ERISA preemption.
As Professor Abraham states, the field of bad faith liability has had
time to mature,"~ but as a field matures, those who plow it sometimes
adjust what they plant in it. Insurers can presumably make better predic-
tions about which bad faith claims are likely to create liability, and insurers
can use their experience to adjust their rates and spread the costs among all
policyholders. I am inclined to think that a bad faith count is included in
most claims against insurers in jurisdictions that recognize the tort. We
must assume that the count adds a premium to whatever value the claim
has, and this suggests that the overall, system-wide cost of recognizing the
tort of bad faith may be large, even if insurers are now able to better
identify and redistribute these costs. My intuition is that treating insurer
bad faith as a contract breach and invoking contract remedies would give
insurers more certainty about outcomes, which in turn would reduce
system-wide costs. But as Professor Abraham explains, the problem is that
we simply do not know enough about the magnitude of any of these costs
or effects.1
37
So the orienteer who has led us to the wrong side of the mountain
explains that she has a hunch about what direction we should now take.
134. Part 4 of Subtitle D of Title I of S. 1757 pertains to corporate alliances, id. §§ 1381-1398,
whereas Part 2 of the Subtitle pertains to regional alliances. Id. §§ 1321-1340. A corporate alliance
is defined as an "eligible sponsor" if the sponsor elects to be treated as a corporate alliance and certain
conditions pertaining to the election are satisfied. Id. § 1311(a). The principle kind of eligible sponsor
for a corporate alliance is a "large employer," id. § 1311(b)(I)(A), which is defined, essentially, as
.an employer that has more than 5,000 full-time employees in the United States." Id. § 131! (e)(2).
Section 1392 indicates that the civil enforcement provisions of § 502 of ERISA "shall apply to
enforcement by the Secretary of Labor of this part in the same manner and to same extent as such
provisions apply to enforcement of title I of such Act." Id. § 1392. It was the civil enforcement
scheme in § 502 that was held to be exclusive in Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41
(1987), and it presumably follows that the drafters of S. 1757 intended this remedial scheme to be
exclusivewith respect to claims to enforcethe requirements ofthe proposedact. There is no provision
equivalent to § 1392 in Part 2 for regional alliances, which presumably means that the remedial scbeme
of § 502 of ERISA is not exclusive with respect to the claims of employees who are not employed by
"large employers" or by large employers that do not elect to become sponsors of a corporate alliance.
135. For further discussion, see Arnold R. Levinson, Defining 'Medically Necessary' and
Clarfying Dispute Procedures Are Key to the Plan's Success, NAT. L.J., Oct. 11, 1993, at S8; Robert
C. Macaulay, Jr., For Employers Participating in 'Regional Alliances, Pre-emption of State Laws
Would be Gone, NAT. LJ., Oct. 11, 1993, at S9.
136. Abraham, supra note I, at 1295.
137. Abraham, supra note 1, at 1315.
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We know little about the consequences of this choice, and it is too late to
go back. But somehow, as experienced participants in the process of legal
change, we know we have been here before.
